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SUMMARY 
Tliis article attempts to cross-examine African Literature and African 
costumary, Islamic and inherited colonial laws. It opens a new topic in the 
study of African literature by showing how legal discourses are inscribed in 
certain African narratives and how these discourses link the narratives to the 
overall context of their production. 
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Il n'existe pas une Vérité, il y a des vérités; chacun détient et expose sa 
vérité. Entre la vérité psychique et la vérité matérielle, il y a une vérité 
fondamentale, objective que l'humanisme professionnel érige en vertu. 
(There is not one single Truth, but truths; each person has his/her own 
conception of truth. Between psychic and material truths, there is a 
fundamental and objective truth that the professional humanist presents as 
virtue) 
(Ndaot, Le Procès d'un Prix Nobel) 
155 Introduction 
In Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation, Richard Posner notes that 
until recently "the links between law and literature, numerous as they are, 
went largely unremarked and unexplored." Until the 1960's, he adds, 
"academic law was for the most part an atheoretical discipline." He 
concludes, "issues of general theory such as justice and interpretation, which 
might conceivably have been illuminated by the study of literary texts and 
literary methods received little attention"(9). Although Posner's statements 
were made in reference to Western literatures, they may be applied to the 
African situation as well, where, to my knowledge, very few attempts, if 
any, have been made to cross-examine African literatures and African 
customary, Islamic, and inherited colonial laws. In spite of considerable 
comparative studies of African literatures and such disciplines as politics, 
linguistics, history, philosophy, anthropology etc., studies of law as it relates 
to African works of fiction or oral literature have been seriously neglected. 
One reason for such a neglect may be an attempt by practitioners of law and 
legal scholars to maintain and defend the autonomy of legal studies and the 
fear by literary scholars to venture into relatively unsafe space. Perhaps the 
more plausible reason lies in the difficulty to adequately define the very 
concept of African law. Julius Lewin makes this point very succinctly when 
he says that one of the difficulties in the study of African law is "in making 
the distinction between customs that might be be regarded as mere social 
conventions and those which are 'laws', that is, features essential to the 
validity of a legal process "(4). This difficulty has come largely from defining 
law rather narrowly as "rules enforced by specific and limiting procedure. . 
." or as that which is "recognized by the courts," "social control through the 
systematic application of force by politically organized society. . . a rational, 
systematic, codified body of rules"(4-5). 
In spite of the difficulties, the need for studies that pull together African 
literatures and law is all the more pressing given the fact that so many 
African writers have drawn part of their inspiration from the traditional, 
Islamic, and inherited colonial legal systems. This is evident in the recurrent 
use of legal stories and the depiction of courtroom situations in many of their 
works. This study, therefore, seeks to open a new topic in the study of 
African literatures, or, more precisely, to connect an emerging topic in 
literary studies by showing how legal discourses are inscribed in certain 
African narratives, and how these discourses link the narratives themselves 
to the overall context of their production. 
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truth. As Peter Goodrich has stated, "legal discourse is...concerned with 
truth, both in terms of evidence or verification, and also, more generally in 
terms of the definition or delimitation of power..."(157). For Michel 
Foucault, each society has its "own regime, its 'general politics' of truth; 
that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as 
truth...the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of 
truth..."(131). In the societies represented in the texts in question here, "the 
techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth" are: 
oracles, the use of the turtle or die poison ordeal. The turtle moves within a 
circle of suspected criminals and the person in front of whom it stops is 
considered guilty. For example, in David Ndachi-Tagne's La Reine captive. 
the turtle is used to determine the guilt of Demayo, accused of having 
accumulated his wealth by killing through sorcery. As for the poison ordeal, 
the myth that supports it, Hilda/Leo Kuper report, "is said to have been 
invented by a man named Justice"(114). It consists of a poison, normally a 
drink prepared and administered to the accused by a shrine priest. If the 
accused survives, s/he is declared innocent. 
The methods identified above are used for cases of theft, witchcraft, and 
criminal cases dealing with life and death which are believed to be beyond 
the jurisdiction of the king or chief who, in those societies, also plays the 
role of a judge. Hence cases outside of those jurisdictions require of the 
judge not only to tap into his/her traditions in the law, that is, customary, 
Islamic, common or Napoleonic laws, but also that s/he be creative and, in 
the words of the late judge Elias Taslim, "truly dynamic." For, as he says in 
reference to Commonwealth African judges, "the African judge is faced with 
tasks or series of tasks that require a good deal of judgement and 
stamina...the judge must have an underlying philosophy that should guide his 
action...to effect a dynamic compromise between law and society, between 
the technicalities of legal science and the requirements of social justice"(210-
211). Andrew Watson's emphasis on the psychological or mental state of the 
trial judge reinforces Taslim's point. As he asserts, trial judges "have a 
multitude of role-defined tasks that we expect them to carry out with 
impeccable honesty, resolute evenhandedness, conspicuous humanity, and a 
high degree of judicial wisdom"(938). Or as D. Jackson stresses citing 
Justice John Parker, "a judge should be 'honest' 'absolutely courageous,' 'of 
understanding heart,' and 'a kindly man"'(941). 
The discussion that follows does not pretend in any way to be exhaustive, 
but does use a few stories as an entry into a major project on African works 
of fiction dealing with different aspects of the legal process; for example, the 
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those stories by the judges and other participants; the questions of evidence 
in the courtroom, the creation of legal ideologies that shape the stories, the 
nature of truth and justice, etc. The short stories under consideration here 
have been selected from a number of court stories in African oral literature 
and fiction both to illustrate the various methods for determining truth and 
on the basis of the kind of difficulties - legal or extralegal - that they raise. 
"Un jugement" (Diop) and "Ijapa and Yanrinbo Swear an Oath" 
(Courlander), both collected from oral literature, present the rather complex 
process of establishing truth, for settling disputes. They also show the 
inability of a legal system to protect itself from inherent cracks that such 
shrewd trickster heroes as the turtle or Ijapa (in Yoruba lore) exploit for 
their own selfish ends as they struggle over meanings or the process of 
empowerment. "Un jugement" reveals the difficulty of deciding on a case 
without precedent since this, as other cases prior, took place in an oral 
context and because this particular case is based on conflicting oral testimony 
by litigants. Moreover, since "Ijapa" reflects a "miscarriage of justice," the 
story seems to question the nature of justice itself and the society's attitude 
towards the concept of justice which, in the words of Courlander, is 
"imperfect and sometimes absent"(144). He continues "while the Western 
literary tradition demands that justice prevail over evil, the view in the 
African society is that good and evil exist as components of life. Sometimes 
justice wins out, sometimes not" (144). 
The point of connection between these two stories and the third selection, 
i.e. Ousmane Sembene's "Souleymane" is that even though the latter is a 
product of the writer's imagination, itS form— short story— and content-
legal situation related to family matters— show that it is also nourrished by 
oral narrative device. The story uses the context of received tradition in the 
law to dramatize the dilemma that results from the subversion of the rules 
and codes of the story. Moreover, it raises a legal argument, as in child 
custody, in its attempt to re-define social re lationship s and to challenge the 
types of male di scourses that h ave been made to fu nction in the guise of 
tradition or as truth in society. The stories are unique and, therefore, 
excellent case studies not only for the kinds of questions they raise or the 
type of attitude that they show towards the received tradition in the law, but 
also for the ways they are used to exploit loopholes in the law and in the 
rather unorthodox but clever method they use to arrive at truth. 
My approach will be textual, that is, I shall examine the stories themselves 
both in terms of the strategy of litigants' presentations, the kinds of legal 
arguments raised by such presentations, and how those arguments help in the 
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from oral and written traditions, I have not attempted to deal with the 
problem of orality as such or the oral context of the two stories collected 
from oral literature. My concern is not whether what has been transcribed 
from the recording of the griot's oral narratives actually happened at some 
remote time in the past or whether they might happen again but rather with 
the legal aspects of what has been transcribed, that is, the written texts. I am 
equally concerned here with the question of interpretation and the legal 
implications of such stories in the context of today's African societies. 
Consequently, I shall also argue that the texts under consideration use court 
scenes and stories not just for aesthetic purposes but to make socio-political, 
cultural, historical, and legal commentaries on the context of their 
production. The reference to text and context always raises the question of 
how to make the link between the text as a fictional creation or as collected 
from oral literature and the real world (context) in which the text is created. 
In this case, such a link seems quite obvious when one considers that the 
story-telling processes of the writer and the characters that produce stories in 
court situations are very similar to the production of stories by litigants in a 
real court of law. 
Given this kind of link between the story-telling processes in real courts of 
law and in courtroom situations in fiction, Ron Christenson's conception of 
law as "the union of primary stories and secondary rules "(8) becomes very 
useful. To this may be added the word "code." I use "code" here in terms of 
what Goodrich calls institutional code, that is, "a set of social conventions 
governing and instructing behaviour, issuing imperatives or offering 
generalized instructions as to how to act "(66). This study will focus on 
primary stories, that is, stories (true or fabricated) that are produced by 
characters as litigants during their trials which, as other stories in works of 
fiction, do lend themselves to interpretations; interpretations from which new 
rules could be derived. Such interpretations must go beyond the texts or the 
stories themselves to the contexts (historical, social, political, etc.) that 
generated the stories. 
As Christenson has suggested elsewhere, stories by litigants are the vital 
elements of law, especially if such stories have neither persuasive nor 
binding precedents. The stories told by litigants may help to shape society's 
thinking or raise its consciousness about the urgent need to revise existing 
rules in accordance with its socio-political, economic and historical 
development. The judgement may become a source of law, that is, it may 
help to formulate new rules. As stated earlier, the bibliography on African 
texts that explore legal situations (court scenes or trials) is extensive, which 
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African societies, has inspired many fiction writers. Some of those writers 
have used their knowledge of those legal systems by way of subversion as 
the following literary stories with legal implications clearly illustrate. 
The search for truth 
In "un jugement," a woman is seeking divorce on grounds that she had been 
repudiated by her husband; an accusation that the husband vehemently denies 
in spite of textual evidence to the contrary. The husband, frustrated by the 
devastation of his watermelon farm by monkeys (his only source of income), 
had displaced his anger onto his wife, finding fault in everything she did and 
had, indeed, said to her, "retourne chez ta mere, je te répudie "[Return to 
your mother, I repudiate you](22). But realizing the economic, social, and 
legal implications of his statement (he forfeits all rights to the woman 
including the bride wealth), he had tried to win back his wife. However, her 
steadfast refusal to return home to a husband who had repudiated her sets up 
a legal situation in which they must consult with judges and wisemen from 
various religious and traditional backgrounds and from many countries to 
validate their statements. The exchange between Demba and his wife had 
been verbal, the question then becomes how to determine who—the husband 
or the wife—is telling the truth; how to resolve a dispute based on two 
conflicting oral testimonies. 
Even more pertinent is the fact that the judge has to use his/her ingenuity 
and ability to draw from various traditions in the law given that cases tried 
in the context of oral tradition are not recorded or documented in writing 
and, therefore, could not be used as precedents. In the absence of any 
precedents, Madiakate, the Imam and judge in the village of Maka-Kouli 
displays the kind of wisdom required of judges by linking the legal to the 
spiritual through prayers. In that way he, unlike other great judges, spiritual 
and political figures who have tried this case unsuccessfully, manages to 
extract truth from the husband and rule in favor of the wife. Indeed as a 
family dispute, the Imam's appeal seems to be the area of Islamic law that 
deals with family matters and forms the core of the moslem society's moral 
code. 
The time of prayer is the moment of temporary retreat into the subconscious 
and spiritual world to enter into communion with God, Allah or the ancestral 
spirits as the case may be. The amen or assaloumou aleykoum (Allah be with 
you) said at the close of a prayer is the critical point where one begins the 
slow transport from the spiritual back to the conscious state. It is precisely at 
that transitional stage where one is no longer in the subconscious, yet not 
160 fully in the conscious state that the Imam asks the simple but crucial 
question: "ou est lthomme qui a répudie sa femme?"[where is the man who 
repudiated his wife?] Demba still in a state of trance, answers, "me 
voici"[Here]. With these words, Demba exteriorizes what he might have 
been confessing to in the silence of prayer. The Imam's verdict is, "homme, 
ta langue a enfin devance ton esprit et ta bouche a consenti a dire la vérité." 
[Man, your tongue has finally moved faster than your mind and your mouth 
has consented to tell the truth](29-30). 
The Imam helps Demba to state or indeed re-state a fact, a fact that places 
his wife in a position to make a choice between returning home to her 
husband and leaving him. But in a society in which rights and duties seem 
defined by status, age, and gender, such as the one represented in the story, 
one would expect the husband to be given the benefit of the doubt, especially 
in a case without concrete evidence. Ruling in favor of the wife or actually 
creating that opportunity for choice for the wife subverts that expectation. 
The ruling has no precedents, either in terms of the technique used to extract 
truth (which is testimony to the Imam's wisdom) or in its social and political 
ramifications. Following the successful! resolution of the case, one may 
conclude that the expert judges who had tried the case earlier had failed to 
reach a verdict because they had foreseen the social, political and legal 
impact of ruling in favor of a woman (a wife) in a society that was striving 
to preserve its status quo in a constantly changing world. 
Moreover, the failure of those judges seems to have been designed to create 
suspense or temporally defer resolution so as to build up expectations to the 
dramatic point where Islam, which in this case is competing with other 
religions, could be shown as non judgemental and especially as very 
effective in creating conditions suitable to finding solutions to extremely 
difficult moral questions. Creating those conditions also helps to define what 
might be called an Islamic ideology since Islam, as many traditional African 
religions, does not judge but simply makes conditions propitious for its 
followers to look within themselves and to become their own spiritual 
judges. 
The traditional legal system does have an appeal process and Demba could 
have used it to challenge the verdict, using as a premise of his argument, his 
state of mind at the time he allegedly made the statement repudiating his 
wife. He could claim, for instance, that as an angry man, he was temporarily 
out of his mind. Furthermore, he could argue, and rightly so, that there 
cannot be a fair judgement at the conscious level based on an utterance "me 
voici" made while still at the subconscious, indeed, a hypnotic level. 
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tried in the traditional courts of the Douala in Cameroon, challenging the 
decision of the patriarchs on the court is tantamount to signing one's death 
warrant. As he writes, "même quand, dans son fort interieur, on ne se sent 
vraiment pas en tort, on se resigne, car on...a peur de ces patriarches aux 
yeux injectes, signe inevitable de sorcellerie...Les vieux ne sont-ils pas, 
partout en Afrique, les premiers sorciers? Si l'on s'oppose a leur verdict, on 
est perdu"(28). [Even when, deep inside, one does not really feel a sense of 
guilt, one dares not oppose those patriarchs with bloodshot eyes, sign of 
•sorcery...who can ignore the fact that those old men are the first sorcerers 
all over Africa? Slhe who questions their verdict is done for]. 
The Imam incarnates judicial, spiritual and political powers. Hence, 
challenging his ruling might be interpreted, not so much as a challenge of 
the legal process itself or a challenge of the intrusion of the Islamic religion 
into the legal process, but as a questioning of the powers and even a 
personal attack on him. So, inasmuch as the Imam has set a legal precedent 
by subverting expectations and ruling in favor of a woman, he still remains 
the patriarch or "le vieux sorcier" of yesterday who has been replaced by the 
absolute ruler, indeed the dictator of today who controls all the institutions, 
including the legal. 
The subversion of the method of establishing truth 
One of the methods identified above for determining truth is the poison 
ordeal. The question is, can the ordeal be effective, that is, can it still lead to 
the acquisition of some form of truth in the hands of such astute creatures as 
Ijapa or the turtle in the story "Ijapa and Yanrinbo Swear an Oath"? Ijapa 
shares many qualities with other tricksters in African lore. He is described 
variously as "shrewd, cunning, greedy, indolent, unreliable, ambitious, 
exhibitionist, unpredictable, aggressive, generally preposterous, and 
sometimes stupid"(127). He is alluded to in many proverbs, one of which 
seems particularly appropriate for the ensuing discussion. "Though Ijapa has 
no legs on the ground, he has wisdom in his head"(a person who is deficient 
in one quality may be strong in another) (Courlander). Ijapa certainly had the 
wisdom and the vision when he and his wife Yanrinbo, driven by hunger, 
broke into their neighbor's storage. The method employed to reach the 
storage reveals both shrewdness and foresight as Ijapa and his wife seem to 
have staged a mock trial in their minds prior to the theft and in the process 
had discovered a loophole that they would eventually exploit to subvert their 
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arbitrary) between the words or language of swearing an oath and the effect 
of the drink or the outcome of the poison ordeal. 
The storage in question stands on stilts, and therefore, to reach it, Ijapa and 
his wife, each, has to perform a distinct but complementary function. Ijapa's 
is to carry his wife on his shoulder and hers is to stretch her hand to remove 
the food from the storage. In the trial, rather than swearing an oath on the 
specific function that each performed, each swears his or her innocence on 
the function performed by the other. For instance, "If I Ijapa, the husband of 
Yanrinbo, ever stretched my hand to remove yams from Bamidele's storage 
house, may I fall sick instantly and die"(71). The truth is that he did not 
stretch his hand. Yanrinbo on her part did not stand on her legs when she 
reached her hand into the neighbor's storage. Courlander's conclusion is that 
the poison had no effect on them because what they had sworn to was not 
false. Consequently, they were both acquitted. 
Emerging as "the victor over both the victims of his theft and the trial by 
ordeal" shows how tricks, if ingenious enough, could be used dangerously to 
subvert a legal process. Of course, such practices of exploiting loopholes are 
commonplace in our societies today. In that context, and to borrow from 
Posner who argues that "law as depicted in literature is often just a metaphor 
for something else that is the primary concern of the author"(l 15), the story 
may be read as a metaphor, indeed, an allegory of a society that is getting 
alarmingly greedy, individualistic and dishonest. The trial also raises the 
question of the effectiveness of the ordeal as a means of getting truth and 
through that to the administration of justice. As stated earlier, this story is a 
commentary on the African conception of justice. The link between the 
words and the (in)action of the poison seems to be based on the fact that the 
ordeal is directed supernaturally by God and the nature spirits . 
Consequently, it is based on faith or belief in those force s, which , in a 
sense, translates into faith in the legal procedure itself. Ijapa and his wife 
accept to swear their innocence because they have faith that if they swear to 
each other's function, the poison will be rendered powerless, thereby 
subverting the process and setting them free. 
Having faith in a process has its own advantages. Relying on faith, however, 
may result in the total surrender of oneself to the spiritual forces to the 
extent that one becomes passive, disengaged and, as such, loses one's 
freedom to question and to re-examine certain elements of the legal tradition. 
Demba, the husband in "un jugement," accepts the verdict without 
questioning because, as mentioned earlier, he does not want to be perceived 
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verdict seems to be an affirmation of his faith in Imam's judgement, the 
legal tradition that he incarnates, and his submission to the Islamic moral 
order that is implicit in the whole trial. The chief who acquits Ijapa and 
Yanrinbo does so without examining the words of the swearing because, as 
the incarnation of the spiritual beings in his society, he has faith in them, in 
the tradition and the means by which they administer justice. 
Elusive truth, justice deferred 
If the court stories in oral literature discussed so far have raised such 
pertinent issues as the methods employed by the traditional legal system to 
establish "its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth," and the question 
of faith in the process, some stories in contemporary African narratives 
dramatize the dilemma of the legal system that is itself on trial because it has 
not kept pace with the socio-political and historical changes in society. The 
stories use the contexts of received tradition in the law to attempt to "de-
naturalize" the meanings that had hitherto served the interests of the 
patriarchy. An example of a story in that category is Sembene's 
"Souleymane," in which a court scene in a divorce trial becomes a platform 
for Yacine, Souleymane's wife, driven like other women in her society into 
silence, to develop her own voice so as to challenge the status quo. She 
challenges the system by raising issues that call for a re-evaluation of the 
marriage institution to better deal with the new element of divorce and child 
custody. 
In the traditional societies, marriage was conceived as an arrangement 
between two families or between two heads of families (males) without 
regard for the woman involved. By asking for the restitution of her virginity 
as a condition of her return of the bride wealth, Yacine implicitly introduces 
into the traditional marriage institution a new legal concept. Her statement 
seems to suggest that marriage be seen as a contractual union which would 
therefore require the mutual assent of the parties directly involved, that is, 
the future couple themselves. This means that each party to the contract 
brings in something. In the case in point here the "unspoken" terms of the 
contract are Yacine being a virgin and Souleymane paying bride wealth. 
Yacine had been found guilty by a group of elders (all men) of having 
deserted her husband, which, according to local law and custom, is valid 
reason for divorce. The same law and custom also stipulate that the penalty 
for desertion is the return of the bride wealth or its forfeiture as the case 
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important emotional and human aspects in divorce cases, many women have 
been forced to quietly accept abuses, exploitation, mental cruelty, and endure 
hardships rather than seek divorce as their fathers who had received the 
bride wealth were unable to pay it back. On their part, some men have been 
very reluctant to repudiate their wives or file for divorce for fear of 
forfeiting the exhorbitant bride wealth that they had paid. "Souleymane" is a 
vivid illustration of that situation. Yacine is caught between her father's 
greed, his inability to pay back the bride wealth he had received from Bilhal 
and her old husband's inability to satisfy her needs. 
After three years in a marriage during which she had one child and endured 
her aging husband's inability to satisfy her sexual needs, she had taken her 
husband's nephew as a lover, an adulterous act which is valid ground for 
divorce. But the law also states that divorce can be granted a woman who 
has suffered neglect and mental cruelty. On that basis, Yacine may claim 
that her act was as a result of her husband having failed to honor an implied 
verbal contract made before marriage, that is, to cater for her physical, 
emotional, economic, sexual and other needs. 
But the difficulty in such a case is how to substantiate those accusations, or 
how to quantify emotional and mental cruelty, especially in her society in 
which women have been turned into economic and sexual objects and, as 
such, are not seen as capable of feeling, or of being hurt emotionally. 
Faced with this dilemma of not being able to prove the unsubstantiable, that 
is, mental torture, Yacine sets a legal precedent in her tradition and in the 
received legal tradition, as mentioned above, by making as a condition of her 
return of the bride wealth her husband's return of her virginity. As she 
bursts out, " si vous voulez, et vous trouverez juste. . Je ne serai d'accord 
qu'a condition que Souleymane me rende ma virginité"(154). The reaction of 
the elders, stunned by this rather bold, legally challenging, biologically 
impossible, and morally compelling declaration, is to retort," cela n'était pas 
écrit dans les ordres et les ordonnances"(154). Such a reaction shows, of 
course, that her demand has raised a legal argument, contractual in nature, 
that challenges both the traditional and the received systems. The argument 
also questions historical assumptions or beliefs in ways that will compel the 
society to re-examine its fundamental values as a step towards major 
revisions in various aspects of the legal system. The question still remains as 
to why they had never thought of or envisioned such a scenario. Why was it 
not written? Why had they not questioned those aspects of their traditions 
that had, up to then, marginalized and objectified women, young men and 
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consideration when the traditional laws and customs were formulated? 
The reaction from the court audience is divided along gender and 
generational lines. While the young people and the women in the audience 
support Yacine's stands, the elders (all men) fail to see the logic of it. Of 
course, to moral, historical and legal revisionists, the logic in her demand is 
quite clear. Prior to the wedding Souleymane had promised "devant le 
peuple, qu'il tuerait deux taureaux pour la virginité de Yacine"(145). It is 
also said that the day followin the wedding, a white blood-stained cloth was 
shown around, "le lendemain, un pagne blanc macule de sang se promena 
dans les bras des unes et des autres, de concession en concession, au grand 
vivat de toutes et de tous"(146). The blood stain was concrete proof that she 
was still a virgin when she got married. One could conclude that being a 
virgin was the single most important factor used by Souleymane to contract 
the marriage. Thus, the substantial amount of money paid to Yacine's greedy 
father as bride wealth was, to a large extent, on the assumption that she was 
still a virgin. By adopting as premise of her argument her virginity, Yacine 
is introducing into the trial process the only concrete, verifiable evidence that 
she has. The logic is that, in a contractual relationship such as her demand 
suggests, fairness be exercized during the termination of the contract, which, 
in this case, is quite logically that she has back her most precious possession 
in exchange for the bride wealth that had been paid for it. 
As to who should have custody of the child, " tous. . . reconnaissaient le 
'droit' sacre du pere de s'approprier son heritier"(155). Saying "son héritier" 
rather than "leur héritier" shows a biased opinion in favor of the father. 
Again putting things in contractual terms raises the question of whether 
either parent can be said to have sacred rights over "leur héritier." The 
Froh-Toll acting as Yacine's defense counsel asks a question that identifies 
and problematizes that issue. He puts this to the elders on the court and the 
audience, " en toute apparence, l'enfant revient au pere. Mais est-on sur 
qutun enfant revient a son pere en droit de naissance?" And the choral 
response is, "Oh . . .oui ... il est mentionne dans le livre sacre"(155). 
Evident in the response of the audience and the statement above is the use, 
by that audience, of some elements of tradition and religion rather 
uncritically to defend the status quo. 
However, the Froh-Toll, aware of the audience's non-evolutionary 
conception of traditions and its unchallenging acceptance of the Holy Book, 
then proceeds to use his own personal story to authenticate, indeed, to 
dramatize his argument: " moi, que vous voyez la, j'ai perdu mon pere, 
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empêche ma venue au monde"(155). But consider that the opposite had 
happened; "qu'au deuxième mois, ma mere mourut. Est-ce que je serais en 
vie?" And the crowd shouted, "non. . . Non." He then asks rhetorically, " 
donc de quel droit Souleymane exige-t-il la garde de ltenfant? In conclusion, 
he remarks, "on peut toujours douter d'etre le pere d'un enfant. . . Jamais 
de doute sur sa mere. . ."(156). Raising these issues helps the Froh-Toll to 
point out the absurdity in custody fights and the moral basis of the Holy 
Book itself (which is at the very root of the fights) since it is used to justify 
giving custody to one and not the other parent. 
Yacine's insistence on having back her virginity introduces human and 
emotional dimensions into a legal system that, in divorce cases, had hitherto 
focused on financial and, to some extent, material aspects. The Froh-Toll's 
eloquent defense adds the ethical dimension, another element that, 
unfortunately, seems to be lacking or seems to have been neglected by the 
traditional and inherited legal systems, developed and manipulated, rather 
conservatively, by men of a certain age to cater to their needs. The 
Froh-Toll expresses those ethical issues in the form of rhetorical questions in 
a very subtle attempt to raise the consciousness of the patriarchs on the 
courts . Rai sing consciousnes s as such i s j u st a stage in the proces s of 
revising the tradi ti on al legal system as it applies to the marriage 
institution. Such a revision would adequately reflect the present context by 
protecting the rights of all people in the society irrespective of their age and 
gender, especially in divorce and custody. 
Conclusion 
Truth, Foucault asserts, "is a thing of this world" and one might add a thing 
of the world of fiction. The court stories discussed here do wrestle with the 
question of truth and the methods of its acquisition. The Imam invokes the 
presence of Allah and the nature spirits to extract truth from Demba. The 
chief has recourse to the poison ordeal in his effort to determine the veracity 
of the statements of both the accused and the plaintiff. In both cases, there is 
a resolution, even if justice has not been served, especially for Ijapa's 
neighbor, who cannot have two criminals 
punished because they have exploited a loophole in the law. In 
"Souleymane," truth is elusive and the dispensation of justice permanently 
deferred because the story attempts to re-define one of the foundations of 
human society, i.e., the family, by proposing that marriage be conceived as 
a contractual union in which all the terms of the contract are clearly 
articulated. At least in that way, when the contract is being terminated 
167 because of divorce, as in the case in point here, the parties can legitimately 
lay claim to what they brought into the marriage even if such claim, although 
legally workable, is biologically impossible to honor, as in giving back a 
woman's virginity. In this case, the man who pays the bride wealth and 
especially the woman, whose emotional and financial needs were not taken 
into consideration, and the innocent child(ren) born out of such a union, are 
protected. 
All the stories reflect a certain attitude towards the legal traditions which 
may be a function of their relationship to the received tradition in literature.. 
The resolution of the cases in the two stories from oral tradition shows a 
certain faith in the traditional legal system. Even though in one case the 
resolution comes after several trials, even though there is subversion of the 
process in another case, the wisdom of the judge in one tradition and the 
faith in the poison ordeal in the other triumph. Such is also the triumph of 
the traditional legal system. Sembene's story shows the loss of faith in both 
traditional and the inherited colonial legal systems. The former has 
hopelessly failed to correct the injustice created by a society that excludes 
one of its segments by reason of sex, age and status. The latter has created a 
framework for even the marginalized to seek justice but the very way that 
the story presents the case by raising issues that question the marriage 
institution, indeed, the status quo systematically subverts the system and 
makes resolution impossible. The attitude towards the received tradition in 
the law manifested in Sembene's short story serves as a transition from oral 
to received tradition in literature and especially such novels as Le Proces 
d'un Prix Nobel (Ndaot,1983), Wrong Ones in the Dock (Aluko,1982), 
Taboo Love (Ngongwikuo,1980), The Night Harrv Died (Ulasi,1974), Le 
Proces du muet (Ilboudo,1987) etc. in which legal stories are used not to 
affirm one's faith in a system but rather to subvert the received legal 
systems, to make critical commentaries on legal institutions and to raise 
pertinent questions about the nature of justice itself which is the ultimate in 
any trial. 
1. I would like to thank the anonymous readers of the earlier version of this essay for 
their invaluable comments and suggestions. 
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